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Abstract: 
This paper studies the effects of patents and subsidies on R&D investment decisions. The 
theoretical framework is a two-stage game consisting of an investment and a market stage. In 
equilibrium, both patents and subsidies induce the same amount of R&D investment, which is 
higher than the investment without governmental incentives. In the first stage, the firms can 
invest in a stochastic R&D project which might lead to a reduction of the marginal production 
costs and in the second stage, the firms face price competition. Both stages of the game are 
implemented in a laboratory experiment and the obtained results support the theoretical 
predictions. Patents and subsidies increase investment in R&D and the observed amounts of 
investment in the patent and subsidy treatment do not differ significantly across both 
instruments. However, we observe overinvestment in all three treatments. Observed prices in 
the market stage converge to equilibrium price levels. 
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1. Introduction 
A bulk of evidence indicates that there is a positive effect of innovative activity on firm 
profits, productivity, economic growth and total welfare (see e.g. Kamien and Schwartz 
(1975) for a survey). However, many empirical studies investigating R&D investment 
behavior find that firms tend to underinvest in R&D compared to the socially optimal 
R&D investment level, e.g Bernstein (1996), Cohen (1995), Cohen and Levin (1989), 
Jones and Williams (1998, 2000), or Steger (2005). For instance, Jones and Williams 
(1998), p. 1133, state that “the optimal share of resources to invest in research is 
conservatively estimated to be two to four times larger than the actual amount invested 
by the U.S. economy.” In general, underinvestment in R&D is mainly caused by the fact 
that firms’ private returns of an innovation might be lower than social returns, see e.g. 
Griliches (1992). The reason for this inequality lies in the special properties of the good 
‘innovation’ itself. A firm can only skim the maximal profit of an innovation if it is the 
exclusive owner of an innovation, e.g., if competing firms are prevented from imitating 
the innovation. Hence, the amount of R&D investment will depend on the degree of 
appropriability of an innovation and thus on the realizable profits of an investing firm. 
In order to stimulate R&D spending governments use different policy 
instruments as incentives. Among frequently used instruments are patent protection of 
an innovation, subsidies for R&D investment costs, granting research joint ventures, or 
announcing research tournaments. All these instruments provide incentives to increase 
R&D investment, but they influence investment levels through very diverse channels. 
Patent protection is used to prohibit the imitation of the innovation by other firms (thus 
targeting at the revenue side of firms’ profits), whereas subsidies are used to decrease 
R&D investment costs and thereby encourage investment and reduce the risk of an 
investment in case of failure (targeting at the cost side of firms’ profits). Research joint 
ventures permit firms to cooperate in R&D (sharing risk and dividing gains) and 
research tournaments are competitions announced by government, often the military, in 
which an award is given to the company first succeeding in the wanted invention (note 
that in contrast to patent protection the rights of the invention are transferred to the 
sponsor of the tournament).1  
                                                 
1 For an overview of different aspects of R&D spending and incentive instruments refer to Scotchmer 
(2005). 
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Especially the first two instruments are very common in various industries like 
consumer electronics, pharmaceuticals, or automobile. In the fiscal year 2007, for 
instance, 184,376 patents were granted in the U.S. (39.37% of the applications) and the 
U.S. government funded 9.22% (24,450 out of 265,193 millions of US-$) of the 
industry’s R&D expenditures (see Performance and Accountability Report 2008 by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office and Info Brief 2008 of the National Science 
Foundation). For Germany similar results are reported: 17,884 patents were granted in 
2007 (30.74% of the applications) and the German government financed 4.5% (1,723 
out of 38,651 millions of €) of the business enterprise sector’s R&D expenditures (see 
Annual Report 2007 of the German Patent and Trademark Office and Research and 
Innovation in Germany 2008 of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research). 
Due to the extensive application and the political and practical relevance of 
patents and subsidies we want to analyze the incentive effects of both instruments on 
firms’ R&D investment decisions in this paper.2 Contrary to empirical research which is 
based on real-world data, where always a mix of instruments is present and the induced 
effects are not easily distinguishable, we test in a controlled laboratory experiment how 
the induced incentives of each instrument actually perform in a direct comparison. 
Specifically, we compare (i) the impact of these instruments on firms’ R&D investment 
with a benchmark situation without incentive providing instruments as well as (ii) 
which of the two instruments turns out to be more successful in stimulating R&D 
investments. However, note that we abstain from a welfare analysis, i.e., from analyzing 
the efficiency of the two instruments in terms of costs and benefits (e.g. due to 
difficulties in the comparability of both instruments’ funding) and rather concentrate on 
the incentive effects of both instruments on investment behavior. 
There exists a vast theoretical and empirical literature also including some 
experimental studies analyzing the effects, usage, design, and drawbacks of the four 
instruments3 mentioned above. Patents might be one useful policy instrument to 
                                                 
2 According to the OECD (2004), p. 2, “(p)atenting has accelerated rapidly in the past decade, with the 
number of patent applications filed in Europe, Japan and the United States increasing by 40% between 
1992 and 2002, from 600 000 to 850 000 per year. The effects of such patenting on incentives to 
innovate, on the diffusion of scientific and technical knowledge and on competition remain unclear and 
vary across industry sectors and technological fields.” Our study is meant to shed further light on the 
incentive effects to innovate of the investigated instruments. 
3 For patents please refer to e.g. Reinganum (1983), or Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001); for subsidies to 
e.g. Spencer and Brander (1983), Hinloopen (2000, 2001), Görg and Strobel (2007), or Aerts and Schmidt 
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enhance R&D investment as they prohibit direct imitation which is seen as the main 
problem causing underinvestment compared to the socially optimal R&D investment 
level. The impact of granting patent protection is typically analyzed in dynamic patent 
race models (among others see Harris and Vickers (1987)).4 In these studies patent 
protection of an innovation indeed increases equilibrium R&D investment. However, by 
creating a the-winner-takes-all situation, patent races might systematically induce 
excessive spending on R&D (i.e., higher than socially optimal investment levels) with 
negative effects on welfare (see e.g. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), or Loury (1979)). 
Thus, although patents set incentives to increase investment level in R&D, drawbacks 
of strong patent protection turn out to be the risk of creating overinvestment in R&D 
and furthermore socially inefficient monopoly pricing of the winner. Experimental 
studies on a one-stage stochastic R&D process by Isaac and Reynolds (1986, 1988) also 
show that subjects spend more under full5 than under partial appropriability and they 
observe that R&D investment exceeds the socially optimal amount under full 
appropriability. 
Subsidies as another policy instrument are used to stimulate investment and to 
decrease the risk of firms investing in R&D since the costs in case of failure are 
reduced. Subsidies should encourage firms either to invest more or to overcome a 
threshold of investing in R&D. Theoretical work (see e.g. Hinloopen (2001)) 
concerning the impact of subsidies indicates that investment levels as well as welfare 
are increased, but that profits decrease.6 An experimental study on the effects of 
subsidies and appropriability on stochastic R&D investment by Davis et al (1995) also 
proves that R&D investment is increased significantly by a subsidy. Other experimental 
studies on subsidizing R&D like those by Buckley et al (2003) and Cooper and Selto 
(1991) rather focus on the effect of different designs of the subsidy in form of tax 
benefits and R&D project funding (see Giebe et al (2006)). 
                                                                                                                             
(2008); for research joint venture to e.g. Suzumura (1992), Kamien et al (1992), or Suetens (2005) and for 
research tournaments to e.g. Moldovanu and Sela (2006), or Fullerton et al (1999, 2002). 
4 Among various aspects of patent laws that have been already studied in the economic literature are the 
optimal length and breadth of patents (e.g. Nordhaus (1969); Gilbert and Shapiro (1990); Klemperer 
(1990); Gallini (1992); Chang (1995)). There exist also studies on patent races focusing on the timing of 
investment and the different behavior of leaders and laggards see e.g. Breitmoser et al (2008), Zizzo 
(2002) and Kähkönen (2005). 
5 Full appropriability of an innovation means that the innovating firm gains the complete profits induced 
by the innovation, i.e., monopoly profits. Therefore full appropriability corresponds to patent protection. 
6 Note that a tax is used in those models to finance the subsidy. 
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The existing literature provides evidence that patents as well as subsidies seem 
to have a substantial impact on rising R&D investment. The aim of this paper is to make 
a first attempt to directly compare the effect of patent protection and subsidies on firms’ 
investment in R&D by running a controlled laboratory experiment. Particularly, we 
investigate the questions whether patents and subsidies encourage R&D investment into 
a cost reducing technology (process innovation) at all compared to the baseline case 
without governmental incentives and which of the two instruments actually leads to 
higher R&D spending thus providing a stronger investment incentive in the 
experimental setting. Our experimental data (i) ensure that only one of the instruments 
is present at a time and thereby (ii) enable us to study the influence of each instrument 
separately and thus to compare them in a controlled setting. 
The experiment consists of a two-stage game in which at a first stage subjects 
are asked to invest in an uncertain R&D project followed by a market stage with 
Bertrand price competition.7 Investment behavior in R&D on the basis of two-stage 
games is investigated experimentally by e.g. Jullien and Ruffieux (2001), Suetens 
(2008) and Isaac and Reynolds (1992). Note that by additionally implementing a market 
stage (second stage of the game), a firm’s private returns from R&D are determined 
endogenously at this Bertrand competition stage (by price setting and demand) and are 
not exogenously given. Following Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) who find that three 
firms are enough to let prices converge to equilibrium prices in Bertrand games, a 
market is assumed to consist of three competing firms.  
Three treatments are run: one with patent protection, one with subsidizing (lower 
investment costs), and - as a benchmark - one without incentive instruments. In order to 
make patent protection and subsidizing perfectly comparable, the experimental 
parameters for both incentive instruments are chosen in a way that in equilibrium the 
profit maximizing investment for firms and thus the social welfare evolving from both 
are equal. Specifically, in our model the patent protects the innovation during the whole 
market duration and the subsidy is chosen in such a way that the investment induced 
will equal the investment under patent protection in equilibrium. Our experiment 
provides evidence that subsidies and patents have a significantly positive impact on 
                                                 
7 A Bertrand market is chosen for simplification in the experiment and to follow the patent race literature 
which often uses a the-winner-takes-all assumption, for a general model see Harris and Vickers (1987). In 
our setting only an exclusive innovating firm can reap all profits at the market stage, the other firms 
receive nothing. 
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R&D investment and that the effect of both instruments on incentives to innovate is 
similar. However, our experiment also shows that firms seem to fail to provide their 
profit maximizing R&D effort as they overinvest compared to their theoretically 
predicted equilibrium level. This implies dissipation of rents since we observe in both 
treatments that welfare on the society level is smaller than in equilibrium. 
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
theoretical model, which is followed by the experimental design and proceedings in 
Section 3. Section 4 encloses the experimental results and with a discussion, in Section 
5, we conclude. 
 
2. The Model  
Consider the following two-stage game with i=1,...,n risk-neutral firms. Table 1 shows 
the structure of the game: At the first stage (‘R&D investment stage’), each firm starts 
out with identically high marginal costs HHi cc = , i∀ , and independently decides on the 
amount it invests in R&D, [ ],1,0∈ir  to gain low marginal costs, 0>= LLi cc , i∀ , with 
HL cc <≤0 .8 Firm i’s probability of successful R&D is given by a continuous 
cumulative distribution, )( irF , with density )( irf , and we assume 0)0( =F , 1)1( =F , 
and that F(?) is monotone and concave (i.e., 0)( >irf  and 0)( <′ irf  for [ ],1,0∈ir  
respectively). In words, we assume constant marginal costs and diminishing returns 
from R&D investment.9 At the second stage (‘market stage’), t=1,...,T consecutive 
Bertrand market periods take place in each of which firms simultaneously set their 
prices, tip , , at which they sell a homogeneous good.
10 Consumers only buy at the lowest 
market price, mintp , and we assume the same (normalized) price-inelastic market 
demand in each period, Q=Qt=1, t∀ .11 In the first Bertrand market period, each firm’s 
                                                 
8 Each firm chooses privately and simultaneously an R&D investment level. 
9 Although it is debated whether R&D investments exhibit diminishing returns in the empirical literature, 
we follow the theoretical papers in the tradition of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). For comments on 
that matter please refer, e.g., to Kamien and Schwartz (1975), Griliches (1990), and Nadiri (1993). We 
also refrain from modeling fix costs, FC, as we do not analyze any decisions to enter the market. 
10 For simplicity, we assume that firms only produce when they can sell. 
11 An implication of assuming price-inelastic demand is that the innovation will be automatically non-
drastic since the monopoly price before and after the innovation (which equals the prohibitive price p ) is 
assumed to be higher than cH. 
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marginal costs, cH or cL, only depend on its own success in the R&D investment stage.12 
We assume, without loss of generality, that high cost firms can then imitate the 
production technology of low cost firms at no cost and also produce at cL beginning in 
the second market period. Thus, in absence of any imitation-prohibiting policy, a firm’s 
marginal costs in the second and all subsequent market periods depend not only on its 
own success but also on whether or not at least one firm has successfully innovated in 
the first period. 
Table 1: Structure of the two-stage game  
1st stage n firms invest each [ ]1,0∈ir and receive with probability 
)( irF low marginal costs c
L; investment costs are ir)1( σ−  
single investment decision 
2nd stage firms have either low (cL) or high marginal costs (cH) and 
set prices tip ,  in each period 
1,...,T  Bertrand market periods 
 • low marginal costs cL cannot be imitated • 1st market period 
 • low marginal costs cL are protected from imitation by a 
patent 
• θ =0,1,...,T-1 market 
periods 
 • low marginal costs cL can be imitated • T-θ -1 market periods 
 
We examine two common government R&D policies that influence the firms’ 
incentives to invest in R&D: subsidies and patents. Subsidies target at the cost side of 
each firm’s expected profit from R&D by covering a proportion [ ]1,0∈σ  of its R&D 
costs (i.e., each firm i pays ir)1( σ−  and government pays irσ ). Patents, in contrast, 
target at the revenue side of each firm’s expected profit by protecting innovating firms 
beyond the first period. More precisely, government prohibits high cost firms to apply 
imitated production technologies for other θ =0,1,...,T-1 market periods after the first 
market period. Note that each successfully innovating firm obtains patent protection in 
our model, i.e., more than one firm in a market might be provided with a patent. Thus, 
patent protection does not automatically create a monopoly. One might argue that this is 
no ‘pure’ patent protection (in the sense of ‘the winner takes all’). However, it is 
realistic to assume that firms might invest in different technology innovations yielding a 
cost reduction and that these different technologies are protected. Finally, we assume 
that the game structure and parameters as well as the R&D success of each firm and the 
government R&D policy (hence the marginal cost of each firm in each market period) 
are common knowledge. In the next subsections we analyze our two-stage game. Due to 
                                                 
12 We assume that there are no technological spillovers at the investment stage: each firm i’s chances of a 
successful innovation depend only on its own investment ri, not on a rival’s investment rj. 
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backward induction we start the analysis with the second stage of the game followed by 
the first stage. 
 
2.1 Market stage 
Depending on the government’s R&D policy and the firms’ R&D successes at the first 
stage, we distinguish between different compositions of marginal costs in each Bertrand 
market which lead to different market prices (for simplicity, we refrain from indexing 
R&D policies and market periods). We assume that among the firms which offer the 
lowest price those with the lowest marginal costs share the demand equally. 
(i) The market price equals the lowest marginal costs in the market and is thus 
either Hcp =∗ or Lcp =∗ . Hcp =∗ is the market price if no firm has low 
marginal costs and Lcp =∗ is the market price if at least two firms have low 
marginal costs. Hence, the market profits for all firms are 0=∗π . 
(ii) A market price higher than the lowest marginal costs is set if merely one firm 
has low marginal costs. This firm sets a price as high as the competitors’ 
marginal costs, i.e. the market price equals high marginal costs, Hcp =∗ . Thus, 
the firm with low marginal costs receives positive market profits 
0>−≡−= ∗∗ LHLii cccpπ  while the competitors receive zero market profits 
0=∗−iπ , ii ≠−∀ . 
For a more detailed derivation of the market prices, see, for instance, Motta 2004. 
 
Note that (ii) may apply to the first market period and all periods that are patent 
protected by government, but in all other cases either no firm or all firms have low 
marginal costs. Moreover, note that market prices as well as Nash equilibrium profits 
are unique for each cost structure (though there are infinitely many Nash equilibrium 
price constellations) and that the only equilibrium situation in which a firm makes 
strictly positive market profits is in case it is the only low cost firm. 
 
2.2 R&D investment stage 
In this subsection we analyze the investment decision at the first stage. In the following 
we concentrate on the case that all firms’ R&D investments are symmetric (i.e., ri≡ r, 
i∀ ) as a benchmark case. Note that there might also exist asymmetric equilibria. We 
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will discuss the equilibrium selection in more detail in Sections 3.1 and 4.1. At the 
R&D investment stage, each firm knows the government’s R&D policy and anticipates 
all possible Nash equilibrium profits at the market stage. 
Proposition 1 (R&D investment levels)   The symmetric Nash equilibrium level of R&D 
investment, [ ]1,0),,,( ∈Δ∗ σθcnr , is characterized by the necessary and sufficient 
condition 
[ ] )1(.1)1()(1)( 1 σθ −=Δ+− −∗∗ crFrf n  
The optimal investment level in R&D ∗r  is increasing in the mark-up from being the 
only low cost firm LHL cccpc −=−=Δ , the number of patent-protected periods θ , 
and the subsidized proportion of the firms’ R&D investment costs σ . However, ∗r  is 
decreasing in the number of firms n; and it is independent of the number of market 
periods T. 
The proof is given in the Appendix A1. 
Proposition 1 implies that both policy instruments provide incentives for the 
firms to increase their investment levels in R&D. Moreover, as a firm can only achieve 
positive profits under Bertrand competition if it is the sole innovating firm in its market, 
the incentive to invest in R&D increases the higher this mark-up is. In our model 
investment levels decrease with tougher competition (i.e. an increase in n), because it 
becomes less probable that a firm is the sole innovator the more competitors are in the 
market. Note that there is huge literature studying the impact of market structure on 
investment behavior providing mixed results (for studies on the different effects of 
competition on investment see e.g. Boone (2000), Schmutzler (2007), Vives (2006), or 
Sacco and Schmutzler (2008) for an experimental investigation).13 The equilibrium 
value of r is independent of the number of market periods T, but dependent of the 
number of patent-protected market periods θ . Since the number of market periods in 
which a single low cost firm can make positive profits is in our model reduced to the 
first period and in the patent case determined by the additional number of patent-
protected market periods θ . 
                                                 
13 Cohen and Levin (1989, p. 1075) already stated that “[e]conomists have offered an array of theoretical 
arguments yielding ambiguous predictions about the effects of market structure on innovation.” 
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2.3 Distributional effects 
In this subsection we distinguish the welfare shares (or rents) of the different interest 
groups (firms, consumers and government) in order to analyze the effects of an increase 
in the subsidized proportion and in the number of patent-protected periods, respectively. 
Thereby, we do not focus on absolute changes of the rents, but rather on rent shifting 
between different interest groups. Given equilibrium behavior of the firms (i.e., the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium investment level of ),(),( θσθσ ∗∗ = rri , i∀ ), we 
investigate the impact of each policy instrument on added rents.14 Proposition 2 
indicates that different policy instruments have different distributional consequences.  
Proposition 2 (Rent shifting)   An increase in the subsidized proportion of the firms’ 
R&D investment costs induces a transfer from government to firms as well as expected 
rent shifting between consumers and firms; an increase in the number of patent-
protected market periods induces as well expected rent shifting between consumers and 
firms. 
The proof is given in the Appendix A1. 
However, note that the sign of the shifted transfers between consumers and producers 
depends on the concrete parameterization. Precise predictions for our experimental 
setup are derived in the next section in order to analyze which group benefits from an 
introduction of subsidies and patents, respectively. 
 
3. Experimental predictions and design  
In the first section, we parameterize the model to derive the hypotheses for the 
experiment and in the second section, we describe the experimental design.  
 
3.1 Experimental set-up: Equilibrium predictions and hypotheses 
Table 2 summarizes the treatment parameters of our experimental set-up.15 Specifically, 
we use the continuous cumulative probability distribution of R&D success 
                                                 
14 Note that we use added rents, i.e., we consider the change of actual total rents in case firms invest in 
R&D in comparison to the situation in which no firm invests in R&D. 
15 In the following the standard case with no instrument is called NO, the subsidy case is called SUB and 
the patent case PAT. 
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5.0
10
1)( ii rrF = , { }99,0∈∀ ir , with density 5.0201)( −= ii rrf  and 5.1401)( −−=′ ii rrf , and n=3, 
cH=500, cL=100 and T=2. As the market stage consists only of two market periods and a 
cost reduction can only be imitated in the second period, we set the patent-protected 
rounds equal to 1=θ  )1( −= Tθ , i.e., the patent protects the innovation during the 
whole market duration T. The subsidy proportion 21=σ  is chosen such that the two 
policy instruments (patents and subsidies) induce equal symmetric Nash equilibrium 
investment levels. 
Table 2:Treatment parameters  
Treatment Investment costs Cost structure 1
st 
market period 
Cost structure 2nd 
market period 
Number of 
independent 
observations 
(sessions) 
NO ri { }HLi ccc ,1, ∈  [ ]1,31,21,12, ,,min cccci =  5(1) 
SUB 0.5ri { }HLi ccc ,1, ∈  [ ]1,31,21,12, ,,min cccci =  5(1) 
PAT ri { }HLi ccc ,1, ∈  1,2, ii cc =  5(1) 
The cost structure is given by ci,t, where i denotes the firm and t the market period.  
 
The continuous equilibrium predictions which will be used as a benchmark for 
our data analysis are given in Table 3 for our concrete parameters.16 The equilibrium 
R&D investments lead to the same added welfare in SUB and PAT which is higher than 
in NO.17 Comparing the effect of an introduction of each R&D policy instrument with 
the situation without policy instruments Table 3 indicates that an introduction of 
subsidies decreases the firms’ expected added profits and government rent, and 
increases expected added consumer rent. The introduction of patent protection increases 
the firms’ expected profits and decreases expected consumer rent. Thus, in our concrete 
experimental set-up the introduction of a subsidy partly shifts rents from firms to 
consumers and the introduction of a patent partly shifts rents from consumers to firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Derivations of equilibrium investment levels are given in the Mathematical Appendix D2. Note that the 
presented investment levels are the symmetric Nash equilibria. In SUB and in PAT in addition there exist 
three asymmetric Nash equilibria given by (56.25, 56.25, 6.25). 
17 The formula for added welfare is given in the Mathematical Appendix D3. The individual welfare 
shares (added consumer, producer and government rent) are given in the proof of Proposition 3. 
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Table 3: Experimental predictions 
Treatment 
Nash 
equilibrium 
investment 
Added 
welfare 
Added 
consumer 
rent 
Added 
producer rent 
Added 
government 
rent 
NO 25 625 550 75 0.00 
SUB 37.16 640.92 640.90 55.76 -55.74 
PAT 37.16 640.92 529.40 111.51 0.00 
For the derivation of welfare shares we use the continuous symmetric Nash equilibrium investment levels 
given in Table 2 as well as T=2, 1=θ , 5.0=σ  and 400=Δc . 
 
The symmetric Nash equilibrium investment level and the corresponding 
implications for welfare shares yield testable predictions about the incentives to invest 
in R&D. Let us summarize our main experimental hypothesis which will be tested in 
Section 4: 
Hypothesis 1: (Investment levels)   Investment levels increase if a policy instrument 
(SUB, PAT) is introduced. 
Hypothesis 2: (Welfare)   Welfare increases if a policy instrument is introduced. 
Hypothesis 3: (Special interests)   Consumers prefer SUB to NO to PAT, firms prefer 
PAT to NO to SUB18. 
 
3.2. Experimental design and procedures 
The computerized19 experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic 
Research in December 2005. We ran 3 sessions (baseline (NO), subsidy (SUB) and 
patent (PAT) treatment) each with 30 subjects.20 Each session lasted about 1.45 hours 
(cf. the Appendix for the instructions). Earnings in the experiment were expressed in 
points. At the end of a session, point earnings were transferred to cash at an exchange 
rate of 300 points = 1 €. Subjects earned on average 14.95 € including a 2.50 € show-up 
fee (average earnings amount to: 16.53 € in Session 1 (PAT), 13.84 € in Session 2 
(SUB) and 14.48 € in Session 3 (NO). 
Each session consists of 30 decision rounds. At the beginning of the experiment, 
subjects are randomly divided into 5 matching groups of 6 subjects each. At the 
beginning of each round 3 subjects (i.e., ‘firm’ 1, 2, and 3, respectively) are randomly 
                                                 
18 Note, firms prefer NO to SUB because the firm’s expected profit is higher in NO than in SUB. The 
reasoning is that the effect of the higher probability of being the alone innovating firm due to the lower 
investment in NO overweighs the effect of the lower investment costs in SUB. 
19 The experimental software was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999). 
20 Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The vast majority (96%) of subjects were 
undergraduate students from the University of Cologne, mostly belonging to the faculty of management, 
economics and social sciences. 
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matched.21 Though subjects know they are randomly re-matched in each round, they are 
not informed that this happens within matching groups. Hence, each session provides us 
with five independent observations. 
Each round of the 30 rounds is divided into two phases. Phase 1 corresponds to 
the investment stage and phase 2 to the market stage with two consecutive market 
periods T=2 (labeled phase 2A and 2B, respectively). In the NO treatment, each subject 
receives an endowment of B=100 points at the beginning of each round. In phase 1, 
each subject has to make an investment decision by choosing an integer of 
{ }99,...,1,0∈ir  points, which is subtracted from his endowment B. Moreover, each 
subject starts with high production costs of 500=Hic  points. Depending on the 
investment decision ir  and chance, represented by the realization of the cumulative 
probability function 5.0)(1.0)( ii rrF = ,22 an innovation may occur which decreases 
production costs to a lower level of 100=Lic  points.23 At the beginning of phase 2, each 
subject is informed about whether or not he successfully innovates, i.e., achieves lower 
production costs, and also about the innovation success of the other two subjects in his 
group (but not about their investment decisions). Thereafter, the first Bertrand market 
(phase 2A) starts, in which each subject has to submit a price { }1000,...,1, 1,1,1, +∈ iii ccp  
between his own production costs { }HiLii ccc 1,1,1, ,∈  and a prohibitive price of 1000 points. 
The { }3,2,11 ∈n  subjects with the lowest submitted price in the market can sell their 
goods24 each earning )( 1,1,11, 1 iini cp −=π  points in the first market, whereas subjects with 
higher prices earn nothing (zero points). Each subject is informed about the lowest price 
                                                 
21 We use strangers matching to avoid cooperation in a repeated game and to retain the one-shot 
character. Price competition experiments show that three firms are sufficient to ensure near Bertrand-
equilibrium prices (see Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000)). 
22 To simplify matters ri is divided by hundred, since this allows subjects to choose integer numbers 
between 0 and 99 in the experiment instead of decimals. Note that by excluding an investment level of 
100 cost reduction remains stochastic even for the maximum investment. 
23 In the experiment subjects are given a table which specifies the investment costs and the probability of 
a cost reduction (i.e., a successful innovation) for each possible investment level. Given a subject’s 
investment decision, the computer program randomly determines based on the corresponding cumulative 
probability function F(ri) whether or not the subject ‘innovates’, i.e., achieves lower production costs (for 
more details of these procedures and the given table see the instructions in the Appendix). 
24 In order to make the design as simple as possible for the subjects, those subjects with the lowest price 
share the demand equally. Thus, we relax the assumption of our model that among those firms which 
offer the lowest price only those with the lowest marginal costs share the demand. Note that this implies 
that the achievable mark-up of a sole innovator decreases to 399=Δc , since its equilibrium price 
decreases to 499.  
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and his own profit in the first market, but no other information is given. In the second 
Bertrand market (phase 2B), due to costless imitation opportunities, each subject starts 
with the lowest production cost among the firms in the first market 
[ ] icccci ∀= ,,,min 1,31,21,12, . The procedure in the second market is exactly the same as 
in the first market: those subjects with the lowest price (n2) obtain profits of 
)( 2,2,12, 2 iini cp −=π  points and those with higher prices zero-profits. At the end of each 
round, each subject i is informed about his round profits, which are given by 
Briiii +−+= 2,1, πππ , and his total profits so far.  
In the PAT treatment, exactly the same procedure as in NO is applied, with the 
only difference that imitation in the second Bertrand market is prohibited ( 1=θ ): Each 
subject’s production costs in the second market are equal to his own costs in the first 
market icc ii ∀= ,2,1, . Finally, the SUB treatment differs in only one aspect from NO: As 
half of the investment costs are subsidized ( 21=σ ), a firm’s investment costs are 
reduced from ri to 0.5ri (compare also Table 2).  
 
4. Experimental results 
The presentation and analysis of our experimental data are organized as follows. We 
start by examining R&D investment levels (4.1) including investment dynamics over 
time and individual behavior. Thereafter, we investigate firms’ price setting and 
resulting profits in the Bertrand markets (4.2). Finally, we analyze the effects of 
subsidies and patents on social welfare as well as on welfare for special interest groups, 
i.e., firms, consumers and government (4.3). In case average results are presented, the 
term average refers to mean value over rounds in the subsequent analyses. Laboratory 
findings and their comparisons with the respective Nash predictions are summarized as 
experimental results (ER) at the end of each section. 
 
4.1 R&D investments 
Table 4 shows the average R&D investment for each treatment and the predicted 
symmetric Nash equilibrium for continuous investment levels.25 At first sight, there are 
                                                 
25 We take the continuous symmetric Nash equilibrium as a benchmark. Note that we get multiple 
equilibria in case of discrete investment levels (all equilibria are given in Table A1 in the Appendix). 
However, continuous and discrete equilibria do not differ (much) as long as we concentrate on symmetric 
equilibria (discrete symmetric equilibria are 25, 37, 37 in NO, SUB, PAT). 
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two remarkable aspects. First, the observed investment level is higher using a policy 
instrument like subsidy or patent in comparison with our baseline treatment with no 
R&D policy: Subsidies and patents increase firms’ R&D investment levels by 35.79% 
and 45.62%, respectively. This indicates that both instruments serve the purpose of 
rising investment levels supporting Hypothesis 1.26 Using matching group averages as 
independent observations a Kruskal-Wallis test reveals that we can reject the hypothesis 
that the investment levels of all treatments are drawn from the same population.27 Pair 
wise Mann-Whitney-U tests reveal significant differences between NO and SUB as well 
as between NO and PAT whereas SUB and PAT investment levels do not differ 
significantly.28 Second, the observed average R&D investment in the experiment is 
always higher than the predicted Nash equilibrium for each treatment. R&D 
investments are about 37.92% (26.00%; 35.12%) higher than theoretically predicted by 
the symmetric Nash equilibrium in NO (SUB, PAT). We will later discuss possible 
explanations for this overinvestment. 
Table 4: Average observed and predicted R&D investments 
Investment levels NO SUB PAT 
Observed 34.48 (23.67) 
46.82 
(32.13) 
50.21 
(35.61) 
Predicted 25 37.16 37.16 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
 
4.1.1 Time path of investment 
Figure 1 depicts observed and predicted average R&D investment levels per round. 
These levels are higher than predicted by the symmetric Nash equilibrium in all rounds 
in each treatment (with only three exceptions in SUB). Considering investment behavior 
over time, average R&D investment levels decrease from the first to the second half of 
30 rounds in NO and PAT (36.59 vs. 32.36 and 52.14 vs. 48.28, respectively), but 
increase in SUB (43.81 vs. 49.82). However, Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests yield 
significant results only for the decrease in investments in NO at the 5% significance 
level. 
                                                 
26 However, note that the theoretical increase in investment levels is higher: Investment levels are 
predicted to be 48.64% higher in SUB (and PAT respectively) than in NO. 
27 In the following nonparametric tests we always use matching groups as independent observations. 
28 One-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests reject the null hypothesis of no differences in average investments in 
favor of higher investment levels in SUB and PAT than in NO (p=0.016) respectively (p=0.004), but 
cannot reject the null hypothesis for the comparison of SUB and PAT (p=0.21). 
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Figure 1: Observed and predicted R&D investments over rounds 
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To examine the dynamics of R&D investment decisions at the individual level, 
we use a simple ordinary least squares regression (Table 5). Due to dependency of the 
observations within matching groups we calculate clustered standard errors. As 
explanatory variables we consider treatment dummies and dummies for firm i’s success 
in reducing its cost in the previous round (i.e., lagged variables) as well as round 
dummies. The treatment dummies (NO, SUB, PAT) are used to generate interaction 
variables with the explanatory variables. In model (1) in Table 5 we consider dummies 
for a cost reduction due to successful innovation of a firm in the previous round CRt-1 
(CR=1 for successful innovation, CR=0 for no innovation), where t denotes the round. 
Round dummies given for the first half of rounds (round 1-15) and the second half of 
rounds (round 16-30) as the base category are considered additionally in model (3). 
Moreover, in the estimated model (2) in Table 5 cost reduction dummies CR are 
subdivided into the cases that only firm i successfully reduced its costs (CR1t-1), that 
firm i and one other firm j reduced their costs (CR2t-1), and that all three firms reduced 
their costs in the previous round (CR3t-1). Note that in all these categories at least firm i 
successfully innovates. The reference category for the three cost reduction dummies 
(CR1t-1, CR2t-1, CR3t-1) is the situation that firm i did not have low costs in the previous 
round independent of the other firms’ cost levels (CR0t-1).  
Model (1) in Table 5 shows that a successful innovation of firm i in the previous 
round has a positive and highly significant influence on its current investment level 
compared to the reference category ‘no success’ (CR=0). Moreover, the coefficients of 
all single cost reduction dummies in model (2) have a positive sign and are significantly 
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different from zero as well: Independent of the treatment a firm i invests significantly 
more in the current round if at least this firm i successfully innovated in the previous 
round compared to the benchmark case that firm i had no success. Note that the 
investment level also increases if one or even both other firms in the market were also 
successful in cost reduction in the previous round. Note as well that being the exclusive 
innovator increases investment levels strongest (compare Table A2 in the Appendix, 
where we drop CR1 as the base category; the coefficients for all other cost reduction 
dummies are negative compared with CR1). In line with the results from above we 
observe a round effect in NO: We find that investment levels in NO are significantly 
higher being in the first half of rounds (first round excluded) compared to the last half 
of rounds, whereas investment levels are significantly lower in the first half of rounds in 
SUB and are not significantly influenced by round in PAT.  
Table 5: OLS regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Investment Coefficient (St. er.) coefficient (St. er.) coefficient (St. er.) 
NO 28.26*** (2.604) 28.26*** (1.962) 26.67*** (2.347) 
SUB 31.78*** (2.086) 31.78*** (1.265) 34.84*** (1.626) 
PAT 27.90*** (3.671) 27.90*** (4.007) 27.33*** (3.663) 
CRt-1*NO 11.18*** (2.226)   11.09*** (2.204) 
CRt-1*SUB 23.34*** (3.096)   23.09*** (2.983) 
CRt-1*PAT 37.49*** (3.884)   37.40*** (3.906) 
CR1t-1*NO   15.82*** (2.607)   
CR1t-1*SUB   25.63*** (2.088)   
CR1t-1*PAT   46.84*** (3.675)   
CR2t-1*NO   11.95*** (2.870)   
CR2t-1*SUB   22.45*** (1.862)   
CR2t-1*PAT   38.12*** (4.337)   
CR3t-1*NO   6.231** (2.581)   
CR3t-1*SUB   23.79*** (3.652)   
CR3t-1*PAT   31.36*** (2.896)   
round1_15*NO     3.39** (1.511) 
round1_15*SUB     -6.004*** (1.917) 
round1_15*PAT     1.286 (1.838) 
N 2610  2610  2610  
R2 0.211  0.218  0.215  
Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for matching group clusters. As we drop the 
constant in the estimated models, the reported R2 is taken from the (analogous) models as presented in 
Table A3. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The above OLS regression measures the effects of the tested parameters in each 
treatment (i.e., whether a parameter has an influence on a firm’s investment level for 
each treatment separately). For a comparison of effects between treatments (i.e., 
whether a parameter has a stronger influence in one treatment than in the other) see 
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OLS regression results given in Table A3 in the Appendix. As the reference treatment 
we drop the treatment dummy ‘SUB’. Table A3 clearly indicates that the positive effect 
of firm i’s successful innovation (compared to no success) on investment levels is 
significantly stronger in PAT than in SUB and significantly weaker in NO than in SUB 
(see models (1) and (3)). Moreover, the positive effect of a successful cost reduction on 
the investment level if firm i is the exclusive innovator or if firm i and one other firm 
successfully innovate is as well in PAT significantly higher and in NO significantly 
lower than in SUB (see model (2)).  
 
4.1.2 Individual investment decisions 
In the previous sections we focused on symmetric Nash equilibrium R&D investment 
strategies, which specifically imply that each firm always chooses a discrete investment 
level of 25 in NO and 37 in SUB and PAT. However, the actual investment levels are 
very diverse: Figure 2 specifies the frequencies of the chosen investment levels for each 
treatment.29 Obviously, in the baseline treatment without policy instruments the 
predominant investment level is consistent with the symmetric Nash equilibrium 
investment level of 25 (this level is chosen in 19.11% of cases). Yet keeping the 
endowment and investing zero is the second most chosen behavior in this treatment. On 
the contrary, in the two treatments with policy instruments the Nash equilibrium of 37 is 
almost never chosen (in less than 1% of the cases). In the PAT treatment the most 
frequently chosen investment levels are zero (15%) and the maximum of 99 (16.11%). 
This behavior obeys kind of an ‘all-or-none law’: a subject either invests his complete 
endowment trying to achieve low costs (and thus a possible competitive advantage in 
the two market periods) or a subject decides on retaining his endowment and not trying 
at all to reduce his costs for the market stage. A smaller percentage of investments of 
9.56% is set equal to the intermediate level of 50. In the SUB treatment the most chosen 
investment levels 0, 50 and 99 are more uniformly distributed (7.78%; 9.33%; 10.33%). 
Investing 99 points is the most frequently chosen strategy in both treatments with policy 
instruments,30 whereas investing the maximum amount plays nearly no role in the 
baseline treatment. To examine these observed frequencies further, we consider 
                                                 
29 Individual investment behavior over rounds is given in Figure A1 in the Appendix. A small fraction of 
subjects sticks to a certain investment level (or adjusts the investment level only slightly over rounds). 
Investment levels remaining constant over rounds are most frequently observed in the PAT treatment. 
30 The accumulation of the maximum investment level in SUB and PAT might be a further indication that 
the introduction of either policy instrument provides stronger incentives to invest in R&D. 
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asymmetric equilibria in the following. Table 6 summarizes discrete symmetric and 
asymmetric Nash equilibrium R&D investment levels for our experimental parameters. 
Note that the discrete parameterization gives raise to asymmetric equilibria. In the 
continuous case there exists only a unique symmetric equilibrium investment level in 
NO, and a symmetric and three asymmetric equilibria in SUB and PAT (compare 
footnote 18). 
Figure 2: Investment frequencies 
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To understand the frequencies shown in Figure 2, it might be helpful to consider 
asymmetric Nash equilibria (see Table 6). In all treatments there exist three asymmetric 
Nash equilibria in which two firms choose 0 and one firm chooses 99. This is consistent 
with the observed investment levels of 0 and 99. However, note that the predicted 
asymmetric equilibria of (0, 0, 99) fail to explain (i) why 99 is chosen even more often 
than the minimum level of zero in SUB and PAT, and (ii) why 0 and 99 are less 
frequently chosen in NO than in SUB and PAT. The first observation might hint at a 
possible coordination failure. The asymmetric equilibria add a substantial coordination 
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problem to the subjects’ decision task.31 The second observation that 0 and 99 are less 
frequently chosen in NO than in SUB and PAT may be explained by additional 
asymmetric investment levels which exclusively occur in NO: In NO the number of 
discrete asymmetric Nash equilibria is highest (in SUB and PAT there exist – besides 
the symmetric equilibrium – only the asymmetric equilibria in which one firm invests 
all and the other two firms invest nothing (0,0,99)). In NO there are in addition 
asymmetric Nash equilibria consisting of R&D investment levels from the interval [20, 
21,..., 30]. Note that although in NO the number of discrete asymmetric Nash equilibria 
is highest, NO is nevertheless the treatment in which behavior is most consistent with 
the symmetric Nash equilibrium. This might be due to the fact that the additional 
asymmetric investment levels are oscillating around the symmetric equilibrium 
investment level of 25. Hence, it seems that asymmetric Nash equilibria can contribute 
to explain some of our data.32  
Table 6: Discrete symmetric and asymmetric Nash equilibrium investment levels 
Treatment  Investment decision ri rj rk 
NO Symmetric 25 25 25 
 
Asymmetric All combinations of investment levels 
[20,…,30] that add up to 75,      
without (25,25,25) 
  0 0 99 
SUB Symmetric 37 37 37 
 Asymmetric 0 0 99 
PAT Symmetric 37 37 37 
 Asymmetric 0 0 99 
All asymmetric equilibria are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
We also examine the dynamics of investment behavior in order to analyze 
whether there is a convergence to equilibrium levels over rounds. Therefore we consider 
investment behavior of the first round as well as investment behavior of the first third, 
second third and last third of rounds separately (Figures 3 – 5). Strikingly, investment 
                                                 
31 However, there seems to be evidence that at least some subjects are aware of this coordination problem, 
because we observe subjects ‘jumping’ from very low investment levels to very high investment levels 
and vice versa especially in the SUB treatment (cf. Figure A1 in the Appendix). In general, investments 
are strategic substitutes since a subject has an incentive to decrease his own investment if a rival increases 
his investment and vice versa (see comparative statics in the Mathematical Appendix D4). 
32 Besides behavior that is consistent with asymmetric equilibria, we observe ‘local maxima’ in all three 
treatments, which occur in 5-scale increments. By local maxima we mean investment levels which are 
chosen more frequently compared to investment levels slightly below and slightly above these maxima 
(e.g. in the range from 50 to 60 investments of 50, 55 and 60 are chosen in more cases than intermediate 
investment levels). This may be explained by the prominence level of numbers (see Albers (2001)) as 
these investment level increments seem to create focal points. 
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levels of 25 (which is no equilibrium strategy in SUB and PAT) and 50 are chosen 
frequently (50 is even the most chosen investment level in NO and PAT in the first 
round). Possible explanations for this observation might be that those investment levels 
are prominent numbers and, moreover, that an investment of 25 gives a 50% chance of a 
successful innovation, which might also create a focal point. However, note that an 
investment level of 25 is chosen much more frequently in NO – where it is the 
symmetric equilibrium level. Thus, at least a part of this percentage in NO seems to be 
driven by equilibrium investment behavior. Furthermore, the fraction of the chosen 
symmetric Nash equilibrium level of 25 in NO remains constant from the first third till 
the last third (although it is lower in the first round in which the most chosen investment 
level is 50). In general, in all treatments non-equilibrium investment levels decrease 
over rounds and there seems to be a tendency to converge to the asymmetric equilibria 
(0, 0, 99). Especially the fraction of zero investment, which belongs to an asymmetric 
equilibrium strategy, increases. Specifically, in SUB non-equilibrium levels (in 
particular choosing 50) decrease over rounds converging to the extreme points 0 and 99 
and also the PAT treatment clearly indicates that the extreme investment levels 0 and 99 
are chosen more frequently in later rounds (non-equilibrium levels decrease in favor of 
0 and 99). 
 
Figure 3: Dynamic view on investment level choices – NO 
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Figure 4: Dynamic view on investment level choices – SUB 
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Figure 5: Dynamic view on investment level choices – PAT 
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ER Investment levels: 
Result 1: Concerning the investment levels the experimental data show the following: 
• The introduction of each policy instrument (SUB and PAT) significantly increases 
the investment level compared to no governmental R&D intervention (by 35.79% 
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and 45.62% compared to a theoretical increase of 48.64%), which is in favor of 
Hypothesis 1. 
• As compared to the Nash predictions, firms overinvest in R&D with and without 
R&D policy instruments.  
Result 2: The dynamics of R&D investment decisions are very similar between 
treatments: previously successful innovation has a positive effect on current investment 
decisions independent of other firms’ success. Moreover, investment levels increase 
strongest if a firm was the exclusive innovator in the previous round and if patent 
protection is implemented. 
Result 3: In NO, the modal R&D investment level is indeed the predicted level of 25, 
whereas the modal level of 99 in SUB and PAT is different from the predicted 37. The 
second and third most frequently chosen levels are 0 and an intermediate level of 50 in 
PAT, and 50 and 0 in SUB. These observations might be (partly) explained by 
asymmetric equilibria. Investment levels tend to converge to the asymmetric equilibrium 
levels of 0 and 99 over rounds. 
 
4.2 Cost structure, prices, and profits 
4.2.1 Cost structure 
The cost structure in the first Bertrand market period (i.e., the number of firms facing 
low costs of 100 and the number of firms facing high costs of 500) is determined by the 
number of successful innovations. The cost structure in the second Bertrand market 
period depends on the cost structure of the first market as well as on the chosen policy 
instrument. Table 7 gives observed frequencies of the different cost structures in the two 
Bertrand market periods (and as a benchmark predicted frequencies in case of 
symmetric discrete equilibrium investment levels). Only in the PAT treatment the 
innovating firms are protected against imitation. Thus, in this treatment the number of 
low cost firms does not change in the 2nd market. In the other two treatments however, 
in the second market period there are either three firms with high costs (if in the first 
market period there was no low cost firm in the market) or three firms with low costs (in 
all other cases). Markets with two or three low cost firms occur more often in SUB and 
PAT than in NO after the investment stage. Moreover, we observe the extreme case of 
three high cost firms (see column ‘zero’ in the 1st period) twice as often in the baseline 
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treatment as in SUB and PAT. The higher percentage of successfully innovating firms in 
a market is a result of the higher investment levels in treatments with policy 
instruments. 
 
Table 7 reveals only slight differences in observed proportions of cost structures 
as compared to those predicted by symmetric R&D investment strategies.33 Specifically, 
predicted proportions are always higher than observed proportions if there is no low 
cost firm in the market in all three treatments, whereas the chances of two or three low 
cost firms in a market are typically higher than predicted.34 This observation can be 
explained by the observed overinvestment in all three treatments. The observed 
frequency of a sole low cost firm is smaller than predicted in NO and SUB, but higher in 
PAT. Theoretically, SUB and PAT should result in identical frequencies of cost 
structures in the first market. Note however, that in SUB more successful innovations 
occur than in PAT (the percentage of two and three low cost firms is higher and the 
percentage of no or one low cost firm is lower in SUB). 
Table 7: Observed (predicted) cost structure in the Bertrand markets 
Bertrand 
markets Treatment 
Number of low cost firms 1st period 
Zero one Two Three total 
1st 
NO 11.67% (12.5%) 
32.33% 
(37.5%) 
41.33% 
(37.5%) 
14.67% 
(12.5%) 
100% 
(100%) 
SUB 4.67% (6.01%) 
24.00% 
(28.00%) 
48.67% 
(43.48%) 
22.67% 
(22.51%) 
100% 
(100%) 
PAT 5.67% (6.01%) 
29.67% 
(28.00%) 
46.33% 
(43.48%) 
18.33% 
(22.51%) 
100% 
(100%) 
  
Number of low cost firms 2nd period 
Zero one Two Three total 
2nd 
NO 11.67% (12.5%) 
0%         
(0%) 
0%         
(0%) 
88.33% 
(87.50%) 
100% 
(100%) 
SUB 4.67% (6.01%) 
0% 
(0%) 
0% 
(0%) 
95.3% 
(93.99%) 
100% 
(100%) 
PAT 5.67% (6.01%) 
29.67% 
(28.00%) 
46.33% 
(43.48%) 
18.33% 
(22.51%) 
100% 
(100%) 
The number of low cost firms indicates how many of the three competing firms in each Bertrand market 
attain low cost of 100. Predicted cost structure taking discrete symmetric Nash equilibrium investment 
levels of 25 in NO and 37 in SUB and PAT are given in parentheses. 
                                                 
33 This is a surprising result. Although the majority of individual behavior is not consistent with the 
discrete symmetric equilibrium investment level, on average similar market structures result as predicted 
by the symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
34 However, Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests yield no significant differences on the 10%-level in observed 
and predicted frequencies for all three treatments in the first market period ( 2χ - values are given by 4.60, 
4.48 and 3.24 in NO, SUB and PAT). It is not possible to calculate Chi-square tests for the second period 
as there are parameter values equaling zero in NO and SUB. 
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4.2.2 Prices and Mark-ups 
Figure 6 depicts the average market price (i.e., the lowest price 
[ ]tttti pppp ,3,2,1min, ,,min=  set in each market) for the three treatments for both market 
periods. Obviously, observed market prices in the experiment are on average close to 
those theoretically predicted (if subjects choose discrete symmetric equilibrium 
investment levels and equilibrium market prices). 
 
Figure 6: Average Market Price 
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The average observed (predicted) market price was derived by taking the observed (predicted) frequency 
of each cost structure after the investment stage (see Table 7) and multiplying these probabilities with the 
observed (predicted) average lowest prices of each cost structure. Note that the average market price thus 
includes all different cost structures. 
 
Under Bertrand competition market prices are mainly driven by the underlying 
cost structure. Therefore, Table 8 presents the average of actual market prices in the 1st 
and 2nd Bertrand markets for each cost structure separately.35 Again, in all three 
treatments average market prices are close to those theoretically predicted. If there are 
only high cost firms in the market (column 1) prices are slightly above 500 in all three 
treatments (in the 1st market slightly higher prices are set than in the 2nd market). If 
there is one low cost firm in the first market (column 2), prices are set again close to 
                                                 
35 We proceed in the following way: After the investment stage four different states of nature may occur - 
the numbers of successful innovations before Bertrand market starts are either zero, one, two or three. We 
calculate for these four different cases the average of lowest prices over all rounds separately for the 1st 
and for the 2nd market. Note that the labeling ‘Number of innovating firms’ alludes only to the number of 
low cost firms at the beginning of the first market period, not to the second market period (where number 
of low-cost firms might differ due to imitation). 
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those theoretically predicted. One low cost firm in the first market means three low cost 
firms in the second market due to imitation in NO and SUB. Thus, prices drop close to 
100 except for the PAT treatment, where innovation is protected (prices stick to nearly 
499). In case of two successfully innovating firms market prices in the first market 
period are between 127.77 and 149.20 on average, depending on the treatment (column 
3). This cost structure implies that there are in the second market three low cost firms 
again in NO and SUB and still two low cost firms in PAT. The last column gives the 
average lowest prices if there are three low cost firms in the 1st and thus also three low 
cost firms in the 2nd market in all three treatments. In case of zero, two as well as three 
low cost firms prices are lower in the 2nd than in the 1st market period. Moreover, 
prices are higher than theoretically predicted in all cases, except the case that one firm 
has low costs and the other two firms have high costs.36 Figure A2 in the Appendix 
depicts average lowest prices for each cost structure in the 1st and 2nd Bertrand markets 
for each round. The figure shows that average market prices converge to the Bertrand 
equilibrium prices over rounds as well as over market periods: First, average prices in 
general converge to the equilibrium price over rounds and second, prices in the 2nd 
market are nearly always set closer to the equilibrium price than those of the 
corresponding 1st market. 
Table 8: Average of lowest prices observed (predicted) in the Bertrand markets 
Bertrand 
markets Treatment 
Number of innovating firms 
Zero One two three 
1st 
NO 508.37 (500) 494.37 (499) 146.13 (100) 124.14 (100) 
SUB 507.36 (500) 473.00 (499) 127.77 (100) 112.69 (100) 
PAT 519.29 (500) 493.88 (499) 149.20 (100) 131.36 (100) 
2nd 
NO 504.66 (500) 113.39 (100) 114.23 (100) 113.55 (100) 
SUB 504.93 (500) 107.26 (100) 108.77 (100) 106.12 (100) 
PAT 504.53 (500) 494.99 (499) 124.48 (100) 111.13 (100) 
The number of innovating firms indicates the successfully innovating firms after the investment stage 
(i.e., low cost firms in the first market period), but does not refer to imitating firms in the second market 
period. Note that in case of a sole low cost firm the discrete equilibrium price is 499, otherwise the sole 
innovator runs the risk of sharing the demand and decreasing his profits considerably. 
 
                                                 
36 Slightly higher prices in these cases might be explained by the fact that in the discrete case firms can 
achieve positive profits even if they are not the only innovating firm with low costs. Note that in the 
discrete case 501(and 101) are also equilibrium prices for zero (two and three) innovating firms.  
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With the average lowest price (market price) for each cost structure given by 
Table 8 we can derive the expected mark-ups of firms depicted in Table A4 37. The 
finding that prices and thus mark-ups are higher if there are only two low cost firms in 
the market is consistent with what has been observed in previous Bertrand market 
experiments: E.g. Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) find that the number of competing 
firms with identical marginal costs influences the fierceness of competition in a 
Bertrand oligopoly experiment. Their data provide evidence that prices converge 
towards the theoretical prediction when there are groups of three or four competitors, 
whereas prices are much higher than predicted when only two competitors are matched. 
Hence, these observations can be explained by the influence of market concentration (of 
firms with identical low costs) on price setting. For a detailed analysis of the mark-ups 
please refer to Appendix A3. 
 
4.2.3 Profits 
This subsection surveys the profits of the firms. We differ between profits achieved 
solely at the market stage and profits over both stages of the game: Market profits 
(given separately for the first period, second period, and both periods) refer to the 
actually realized profit per firm at the market stage and round profits defined as 
endowment - investment cost + market profits over both periods give profits over both 
stages (including the investment and the market stage). Table 9 gives average market 
profits over rounds for both periods separately and in sum.38 
For each specific cost structure after the investment stage )( 1,
H
ii cπ  and )( 1,Lii cπ  denote 
firm i’s profits depending on its marginal costs (e.g. Hic 1,  refers to firm i starting with 
high marginal costs after the investment stage in market period t=1). Note that in NO 
and SUB in case of one and two low cost firms after the investment stage all three firms 
face low costs in the 2nd market period due to imitation. Table 9 summarizes average 
total market profits per firm for all cost structures as well as market profits per firm 
                                                 
37 Note that only those firms benefit from the mark-up who set the lowest price in their market. 
38 Note that there is a difference between mark-ups and market profits. Mark-up refers to the potential 
profit margin in a market with a specific cost structure, thus measuring a firm’s profit margin if a single 
firm sets the lowest price. Since mark-ups present the potential profit margin they can be interpreted as 
incentives to innovate in order to enable a firm to set the lowest price in the market. Average market 
profits, however, refer to the sum of actually realized profits in a market divided by the number of firms, 
thus measuring the average profit per firm (including also the ‘losing’ firms). Hence, average market 
profits can be seen as the expected profit a firm could obtain ex ante. 
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separately for low and high cost firms if both types share a market. Total market profits 
give the average profit of a market per firm for each cost structure (which naturally 
equals profits of solely high (low) cost firms in zero (three)). Concentrating on average 
total market profits over both market periods (which can be interpreted as a firm’s 
expected profit at the market stage before it gets to know if it successfully innovates or 
not) it holds again for each possible cost structure that firms benefit most from PAT and 
achieve lowest profits in SUB as theoretically predicted (for this matter refer also to the 
following subsection). 
Table 9: Average market profits per high and low cost firms  
Treatment 
Number of innovating firms 
Zero One Two three 
)( 1,
H
ii cπ = 
total 
)( 1,
L
ii cπ  )( 1,Hii cπ  Total )( 1,Lii cπ  )( 1,Hii cπ  Total )( 1,
L
ii cπ = 
total 
NO_1st 2.79 390.25 0.00 130.08 21.45 0.00 14.30 8.05 
SUB_1st 2.45 367.44 0.00 122.48 13.89 0.00 9.26 4.23 
PAT_1st 6.43 389.38 0.00 129.79 24.60 0.00 16.40 10.45 
NO_2nd 1.55 5.49 3.95 4.46 3.99 6.25 4.74 4.52 
SUB_2nd 1.64 1.76 2.75 2.42 2.33 4.10 2.92 2.04 
PAT_2nd 1.51 389.93 0.28 130.16 12.24 0.00 8.16 3.71 
NO_both 4.34 395.74 3.95 134.55 25.44 6.25 19.05 12.56 
SUB_both  4.10 369.21 2.75 124.90 16.22 4.10 12.18 6.27 
PAT_both  7.94 779.31 0.28 259.96 36.84 0.00 24.56 14.16 
 
Now we take a look on firms’ average round profits including the investment 
stage. We can interpret the average round profits as the expected profits a firm can gain 
in general in a specific treatment per round (regardless of a specific cost structure). As 
round profits measure the ex ante expected profit, they indicate which treatment is most 
profitable for firms. Table 10 summarizes the average (predicted) profits of all firms 
over all rounds for the three treatments. Note that round profits (observed as well as 
predicted) are smallest in SUB, however profits do not differ significantly between 
treatments. A Kruskal-Wallis test as well as pair-wise Mann-Whitney-U tests reveal no 
significant differences in average profits across treatments using matching groups.39  
                                                 
39 Kruskal-Wallis test yields p=0.171 and pair-wise one-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests yield p=0.274 (NO-
SUB), p=0.075 (NO-PAT) and p=0.075 (SUB-PAT).  
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Table 10: Average observed and predicted round profits 
Round profits NO SUB PAT 
Observed 119.25 (119.92) 
114.11 
(102.85) 
141.34 
(226.07) 
Predicted 124.88 118.74 137.48 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. To calculate predicted levels we use the discrete symmetric 
equilibrium (25 in NO and 37 in SUB and PAT) and 399=Δc . 
 
ER Cost structures, prices and profits:  
Result 4: The predicted and observed proportions of market structures show only slight 
differences.   
 
Result 5: Average market prices converge to predicted Bertrand market prices (over 
rounds as well as over subsequent market periods). This results in mark-ups (and thus 
the incentive to invest in R&D) being highest in PAT (over the two market periods). 
Observed mark-ups of a sole low cost firm are somewhat lower than in Nash 
equilibrium and mark-ups are somewhat higher when there are zero, two, or three low 
cost firms. 
 
Result 6: Firms’ profits are highest in PAT and lowest in SUB (although we find no 
significant difference), which confirms the tendency of firms’ interest as stated in 
Hypothesis 3. 
 
4.3 Welfare effects 
In this subsection, we examine the effects of subsidies and patents on welfare at the 
society level and at the level of interest groups (i.e., consumers, firms,40 and 
government). For each treatment Table 11 gives observed and predicted (in parentheses) 
added welfare as compared to a benchmark situation in which all firms make zero-R&D 
investments. There are three main observations: First, in comparison to zero-
investments in R&D, total social welfare (as well as total consumer surplus and total 
firms’ profits) increases intensely if firms invest in R&D with and without R&D 
instruments (which is shown by the fact that all added values in all treatments are 
positive). Second, if firms invest in R&D, added social welfare (NO: 600.56; SUB: 
                                                 
40 Note that we refrain from including the firms’ experimental endowment of 100 in the producer rent in 
contrast to round profits presented in Table 10 in the last subsection. Here we use instead the formula of 
rents given in Appendix A1. 
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620.88; and PAT: 601.38) does not differ significantly between our treatments,41 which 
implies that added social welfare cannot be enhanced by the introduction of policy 
instruments. However, subsidies and patents have very different consequences for the 
distribution of welfare within society. As compared to the situation without R&D policy 
(NO), on the one hand subsidies increase consumer welfare by 105.95 points and on the 
other hand they reduce industry profits by 15.42 points and government budget by 70.23 
points. In contrast, patents decrease consumer welfare by 65.47 points, leave the 
government budget unaffected, and increase firms’ profits by 66.29 points.42 Third, 
observed added social welfare and added welfare shares are lower than the theoretically 
predicted values (besides consumer rent in SUB and producer rent in PAT),43 which can 
be explained by the overinvestment mentioned above. This result implies that those 
interest groups which are anyway privileged by a policy instrument (consumers in SUB 
and firms in PAT), realize even higher rents than predicted at the expense of the already 
disadvantaged group.  
However, it remains the problematical question what practical implications can 
actually be derived. Our welfare results have to be interpreted with caution as our model 
and experimental setting are subject to some limitations which deserve mention: We 
neglected the funding of subsidies (for instance, in our model government budget is not 
linked to consumers by tax) and further patent costs (which occur due to the possible 
monopoly position of an innovating firm with patent protection: e.g. future welfare 
might decrease as firms’ incentives decrease to invest in future R&D projects). For 
these reasons a complete welfare analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. But even in 
our simplified framework it can be shown that the decisions of whether and which R&D 
policy should be introduced seem to be sensitive to the political process of interests. 
 
 
                                                 
41 Using added welfare per matching group a Kruskal-Wallis test yields p>0.5 and two-tailed Mann-
Whitney-U tests p>0.1 for each comparison. Note however, that a replication of the experiment would be 
reasonable in order to check the robustness of results by getting more independent observations. 
42 The increase in consumer rent if SUB is introduced compared to NO is significant at the 1%-level (one-
tailed Mann-Whitney-U test). All other comparisons do not yield significant differences. This result might 
be partly driven by a small sample size of only 5 independent observations. 
43 CR in SUB is higher than expected, because more successful innovations take place than theoretically 
predicted (compare Table 6: theoretically SUB and PAT should provide identical cost structures (due to 
the Nash equilibrium of 37 in both treatments), however more successful innovations occur in SUB for 
two and three firms). In PAT we observe a higher than predicted frequency of one low cost firm in the 
market which might explain the higher PR. 
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Table 11: Average welfare effects 
Treatment 
Added welfare – observed (predicted) 
Social welfare Consumers Producers Government 
NO 
600.56 
(623.25) 
542.83 
(548.63) 
57.74     
(74.63) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
SUB 
620.88 
(639.03) 
648.78 
(638.31) 
42.32      
(56.23) 
-70.23 
(-55.50) 
PAT 601.38 (639.03) 
477.36 
(526.58) 
124.03 
(112.45) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
To calculate predicted levels we use the discrete symmetric equilibrium (25 in NO and 37 in SUB and 
PAT) and 399=Δc . 
 
ER Welfare effects: 
Result 7: R&D subsidies and patents do not increase social welfare significantly (due 
to overinvestment), thus we question Hypothesis 2. However, we observe an (although 
not significant) tendency that both policy instruments cause redistribution within 
society. With subsidies, consumers gain welfare at the expense of industry profits and 
government budget. With patents, the industry increases profits at the expense of 
consumer welfare. These results seem to support Hypothesis 3. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the performance of two prominent policy instruments used to 
enhance firms’ investments in R&D: subsidies and patents. A successful R&D 
innovation entails lower marginal costs for the innovating firm. We use a two-stage 
stochastic R&D model with an investment stage followed by a Bertrand price 
competition stage with two market periods and derive equilibrium investments and 
prices for our experimental parameters. In equilibrium, both patents and subsidies 
induce the same amount of R&D investment, which is higher than the investment 
without governmental incentives. To test these theoretical predictions we run an 
experiment comparing a baseline treatment without any policy instrument with two 
treatments in which either subsidies are paid to investing firms or in which innovating 
firms are granted patent protection respectively. Our main finding at the investment 
stage is a significant increase in investment levels if a policy instrument is implemented. 
Thus, our experiment provides evidence that both instruments are effective in 
promoting investments in R&D.44 However, we observe overinvestment in all three 
                                                 
44 Theoretically both introducing a subsidy as well as patent protection should increase the investment 
level by the same amount compared to the situation in which no policy instrument is used. This is 
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treatments. This overinvestment might be on the one hand explained by asymmetric 
discrete equilibrium investment levels (especially those in which one firm invests the 
maximal amount and two other firms refrain from investing) and a simple coordination 
failure of the subjects. On the other hand, this result might be (also) due to the specific 
properties of a Bertrand market: a Bertrand market leads to ‘aggressive’ interaction 
among vigorous competitors. Competition in a Bertrand market is very strong in the 
sense that a firm makes zero-profits for sure if it does not become the only innovator in 
the market.45 Maybe this all-or-none property tempts subjects into overinvesting in 
R&D. 
Concerning the market stage we observe that although prices are set slightly 
above the marginal costs, they converge to the theoretically predicted Bertrand 
equilibrium prices both over rounds as well as over market periods. In general, note that 
despite the complex experimental setting (like implementing a two-stage game with 
endogenously determined profits), theory predicts outcomes on average quite well 
although individual investment behavior diverges from the predicted symmetric Nash 
equilibrium: e.g. market structures, average market prices, and average profits are close 
to the theoretically predicted levels. 
Our data show that R&D investment increases added social welfare compared to 
no R&D investment, but also exposes that R&D subsidies as well as patents do not 
strongly affect social welfare compared to no policy instrument. This result is driven by 
the observed overinvestment discussed above. However, both policy instruments cause 
substantial redistribution within society. Firms fare better under patents than under no 
policy, the latter still yields higher profits than subsidies. The investigation of different 
‘interest groups’ is important for policy analysis, because it reveals where support and 
opposition can be expected. Nevertheless, the described results should be interpreted 
carefully. Due to several limitations of our model an extensive welfare analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Limitations of our analysis are the following: we do not 
include funding of the instruments, i.e., taxes would change the consumer surplus, for 
                                                                                                                             
supported by our experimental results as the investment level does not differ significantly across the 
treatments SUB and PAT. 
45 Expecting Bertrand competition at the second stage creates a kind of the-winner-takes-all situation at 
the investment stage. Patent race literature suggests that non-colluding firms invest excessively in R&D 
(for a seminal paper see Loury (1979)). Doraszelski (2008) shows that this result strongly hinges on the 
winner-takes-all assumption. If this assumption is relaxed and patent protection becomes less effective 
firms might even underinvest in R&D. 
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instance, nor do we take the costs of granting patent protection into account. Patents 
have two effects on social welfare: on the one hand they provide incentives to innovate 
in R&D, but on the other hand they might create monopolies. If a firm holds a 
monopoly position this could in turn inhibit near-term following innovations.46 These 
intertemporal aspects are neglected in our static framework analysis. Thus, as it is 
shown by Bessen and Maskin (2006), patents may be desirable to encourage innovation 
in a static setting (e.g. in their static model a patent protection leads to higher profits of 
a firm undertaking R&D as well as to higher welfare), but they might actually inhibit 
complementary innovation in a sequential setting in which imitation might even become 
a spur to innovation. Scotchmer (1991) also notes that including positive externalities 
and intertemporal knowledge spillovers, which early innovators confer on later 
innovators, poses new problems for the optimal design of patent law. Furthermore, our 
model lacks R&D coordination and cooperation (like cross-licensing agreements and 
joint ventures), which is very common in R&D intensive markets (compare e.g. 
Morasch (1995)). All these factors might have an essential influence on the impact of 
policy instruments on R&D investment and their successful implementation and should 
be investigated in future research. 
Hence, further research is to be done on the robustness of our results concerning 
the effects of the policy instruments on investment behavior. Of course, our results 
cannot yield conclusive evidence for policy implications as we simplified the model a 
lot. However, our experiment is a first step and its insights might contribute to a broader 
research agenda on R&D investment promoting policy instruments: Our findings 
suggest that the tested policy instruments serve the purpose of rising investments and 
that the choice of an appropriate instrument depends on the political process of interests. 
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Appendix 
Written instructions (translation from German) 
Welcome and thank you very much for participating in this experiment. You receive 
2.50 € for participating. Depending on your and other participants’ decisions you can 
earn additional money. You collect points during the experiment with 300 points 
equaling 1 €. At the end of the experiment your accumulated points will be converted 
into € and together with the 2.50 € paid out to you in cash. Payoffs remain anonymous. 
During the whole experiment, starting now, communication with other participants is 
strictly forbidden. If you have a question, please raise your hand. An experimenter will 
come to your place and answer your questions. 
 
The experiment 
The experiment consists of 30 rounds. At the beginning of each round all participants 
are randomly divided into groups of 3 participants, i.e., the composition of your group 
changes in each round. In the following we refer to the 3 participants of your group as 
firm 1, 2, and 3. Your firm number is randomly drawn anew in each round. You do not 
interact with other groups in a respective round. Your identity is not revealed at any 
time before, during or after the experiment. 
At the beginning of each round each participant receives an endowment of 100 points 
which is credited your personal account of points. 
Each round consists of 2 phases (“phase 1” and “phase 2“). In addition phase 2 consists 
of two sub-phases (“phase 2A“ and “phase 2B“). You make three decisions in each 
round, one in phase 1 and one in each of the phases 2A and 2B. 
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Phase 1 – 1st Decision 
In phase 1 you and the two other firms in your group can make an investment. Each 
firm can influence the level of its costs in the current round by its investment. You can 
have either high or low costs. You invest by choosing an amount of points (integer) 
between 0 and 99 (0, 1, 2, …, 98, 99). Only you know your own investment (chosen 
points), it cannot be observed by any other firm. The same applies to the other firms. 
PAT and NO: 
Your investment induces investment costs; they are equal to your investment (= 
chosen points) and will be subtracted from your endowment of 100 points. 
SUB: 
Your investment induces investment costs; they are equal to half of your investment 
(= chosen points) and will be subtracted from your endowment of 100 points. 
 
Your investment level determines the probability of having costs of 100 points (“low 
costs“) or of 500 points (“high costs“) in the current round. The higher your 
investment, the higher the probability that you have low costs (100 points). The same 
applies to the two other firms in your group.47  
After you and the other two firms in your group made their investment decision, the 
computer separately draws a random number for each firm. The number is in the range 
of 0.1 and 100 whereby all numbers (0.1, 0.2, …, 99.8, 99.9, 100) have an equal chance 
to be drawn.  
Two alternatives arise: 
1) Your random number is smaller than or equal to your probability of 
obtaining costs of 100 points: In this case your costs amount to 100 points. 
2) Your random number is higher than your probability of obtaining costs of 
100 points: In this case your costs amount to 500 points. 
The same applies to both other firms in your group. Thus, your costs only depend on 
your own investment level which yields the probability of obtaining certain costs and 
chance. Four different situations can arise: Either none, 1, 2 or all 3 firms of your group 
                                                 
47 All participants received a table containing all possible investment levels, the according investment 
costs, and the resulting probabilities of obtaining costs of 100 or 500 points. The probabilities are 
calculated by the formula 100/i , i stands for the investment of one firm. 
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have low costs of 100 points (the rest of the firms in the group faces high costs of 500 
points). 
 
Phase 2A – 2nd Decision 
At the beginning of phase 2A each firm within your group gets to know the costs of all 
three firms.  
Each firm in your group is asked to choose a price between your own costs in phase 2A 
and 1000, i.e., a price either between 100, 101, 102, … 999, 1000, if you have low costs 
or between 500, 501, 502, .., 999, 1000, if you have high costs. Each firm only knows 
its own price and cannot observe the prices of the other two firms.  
 
After all firms made their decisions, the computer identifies the lowest price within your 
group which all three firms get to know. There are three possibilities for your group in 
phase 2A with the according profits: 
1) One firm in your group has chosen the lowest price: 
The profit in points of the firm with the lowest price in phase 2A is calculated by 
subtracting the costs of this firm in phase 2A from its chosen price. Both firms with 
the higher prices receive nothing (0 points) in phase 2A, independent of their prices 
and costs in phase 2A. 
2) Two firms in your group have chosen the same lowest price:  
The profit in points of each firm with the same lowest price in phase 2A is calculated 
by subtracting the costs from the chosen price and dividing the result by two. The 
firm with the higher price receives nothing (0 points) in phase 2A, independent of its 
price and costs in phase 2A. 
3) All three firms in your group have chosen the same price: 
The profit in points of each firm in phase 2A is calculated by subtracting the costs 
from the chosen price and dividing the result by three. 
 
If you have not chosen the lowest price of your group in phase 2A, you will not bear 
any costs. At the end of phase 2A your profit, which can either be positive or zero, is 
credited your personal account of points. 
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Phase 2B – 3rd Decision 
PAT: 
The 3rd decision is identical to the 2nd decision. Each firm’s costs have not changed 
compared to phase 2A.  
NO and SUB: 
The 3rd decision just differs slightly from the 2nd decision in phase 2A. The decision 
procedure and the computation of profits in phase 2B are the same as in phase 2A. But 
compared to phase 2A there is an important difference: In phase 2B the costs of all 
firms in one group are the same. The equal cost level in phase 2B corresponds to 
the lowest costs within the group in phase 2A. The costs in phase 2B which are 
identical for all three firms in your group are announced within your group before you 
have to choose your price. 
After a round (consisting of phase 1, phase 2A, and phase 2B) is finished you are 
informed again about your decisions and the results of this round. Afterwards the next 
round starts. 
 
Profit per Round 
Profit per round =  
Phase 1  endowment per round – investment costs in phase 1 
Phase 2  + profit in phase 2A 
  + profit in phase 2B 
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Probabilites and costs (for NO and PAT, in SUB investment costs are halved) 
Your investment (chosen 
points) Your investment costs 
Probability of getting 
costs of 100 points in %
Probability of getting 
costs of 500 points in %
0 0 0,0 100,0 
1 1 10,0 90,0 
2 2 14,1 85,9 
3 3 17,3 82,7 
4 4 20,0 80,0 
5 5 22,4 77,6 
6 6 24,5 75,5 
7 7 26,5 73,5 
8 8 28,3 71,7 
9 9 30,0 70,0 
10 10 31,6 68,4 
11 11 33,2 66,8 
12 12 34,6 65,4 
13 13 36,1 63,9 
14 14 37,4 62,6 
15 15 38,7 61,3 
16 16 40,0 60,0 
17 17 41,2 58,8 
18 18 42,4 57,6 
19 19 43,6 56,4 
20 20 44,7 55,3 
21 21 45,8 54,2 
22 22 46,9 53,1 
23 23 48,0 52,0 
24 24 49,0 51,0 
25 25 50,0 50,0 
26 26 51,0 49,0 
27 27 52,0 48,0 
28 28 52,9 47,1 
29 29 53,9 46,1 
30 30 54,8 45,2 
31 31 55,7 44,3 
32 32 56,6 43,4 
33 33 57,4 42,6 
34 34 58,3 41,7 
35 35 59,2 40,8 
36 36 60,0 40,0 
37 37 60,8 39,2 
38 38 61,6 38,4 
39 39 62,4 37,6 
40 40 63,2 36,8 
41 41 64,0 36,0 
42 42 64,8 35,2 
43 43 65,6 34,4 
44 44 66,3 33,7 
45 45 67,1 32,9 
46 46 67,8 32,2 
47 47 68,6 31,4 
48 48 69,3 30,7 
49 49 70,0 30,0 
50 50 70,7 29,3 
51 51 71,4 28,6 
52 52 72,1 27,9 
53 53 72,8 27,2 
54 54 73,5 26,5 
55 55 74,2 25,8 
56 56 74,8 25,2 
57 57 75,5 24,5 
58 58 76,2 23,8 
59 59 76,8 23,2 
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60 60 77,5 22,5 
61 61 78,1 21,9 
62 62 78,7 21,3 
63 63 79,4 20,6 
64 64 80,0 20,0 
65 65 80,6 19,4 
66 66 81,2 18,8 
67 67 81,9 18,1 
68 68 82,5 17,5 
69 69 83,1 16,9 
70 70 83,7 16,3 
71 71 84,3 15,7 
72 72 84,9 15,1 
73 73 85,4 14,6 
74 74 86,0 14,0 
75 75 86,6 13,4 
76 76 87,2 12,8 
77 77 87,7 12,3 
78 78 88,3 11,7 
79 79 88,9 11,1 
80 80 89,4 10,6 
81 81 90,0 10,0 
82 82 90,6 9,4 
83 83 91,1 8,9 
84 84 91,7 8,3 
85 85 92,2 7,8 
86 86 92,7 7,3 
87 87 93,3 6,7 
88 88 93,8 6,2 
89 89 94,3 5,7 
90 90 94,9 5,1 
91 91 95,4 4,6 
92 92 95,9 4,1 
93 93 96,4 3,6 
94 94 97,0 3,0 
95 95 97,5 2,5 
96 96 98,0 2,0 
97 97 98,5 1,5 
98 98 99,0 1,0 
99 99 99,5 0,5 
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Mathematical Appendix  
A1: Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1. Firm i’s expected total profit is given by 
[ ] ,)1()1()(1)(),( 1 iniiiiei rcrFrFrr σθπ −−Δ+−= −−−  
where cΔ  gives i’s mark-up if it is the only low cost firm, which occurs with 
probability [ ] 1)(1)( −−− nii rFrF  for 1+θ  periods, and ir)1( σ−  gives its R&D costs net 
of subsidy.48 
Maximization of i’s expected total profit with respect to ri yields 
[ ] .,0)1()1()(1)(),( !1 icrFrf
r
rr n
ii
i
ii
e
i ∀=−−Δ+−=∂
∂ −
−
∗− σθπ  
Rearranging and assuming symmetry, i.e., ri=r, i∀ , yields condition (1) as stated in our 
proposition: 
[ ] ,1)1()(1)( 1 σθ −=Δ+− −∗∗ crFrf n  
where the left-hand and right-hand sides (henceforth LHS and RHS, respectively) give 
the expected marginal revenues MRe, and marginal costs MC, of R&D investment, 
respectively. Comparative static analysis with each of the parameters θ,cΔ  and n is 
conducted like follows: We can rewrite condition (1) as cxrxg =))(,( , where the LHS 
is a function of ),,( ncx θΔ∈ , which is the parameter of interest, and the investment 
level r. The RHS is a constant c. A marginal change in x leads to .0=+
dx
dr
dr
dg
dx
dg  We 
are interested in 
dx
dr . Note that LHS is strictly decreasing in r ( 0<
dr
dg ), because: 
[ ] [ ][ ] ( )1,00)1()(1)()1()(1)( 221 ∈<Δ+−−−−′=∂∂ −− rforcrFrfnrFrfrLHS nn θ  
with 0 )](1)[( 1-n <−′ rFrf  and 0 )](1)[()1( 2-n >−− rFrfn . 
We derive for each specific x the derivative 
dx
dg  and thus can conclude whether 
dx
dr  
must be increasing or decreasing. The procedure is analogous for the comparative 
statics with the parameter σ : Here we use the first order condition: 
                                                 
48 A discount factor for the profits realized in subsequent rounds is neglected. 
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[ ] 0)1()1()(1)( !1 =−−Δ+− −−∗ σθ crFrf nii , which can be rewritten as cxrxg =))(,(  
again. 
This analysis exposes the following influence of each parameter on the optimal 
investment level r: 
• Mark-ups: For a change in cΔ , 0>Δcd
dg  and thus 0>Δcd
dr  which implies that the 
equilibrium value of r increases if cΔ  increases. 
• Patent-protected market periods: For a change in θ , 0>θd
dg  and thus 0>θd
dr  
which implies that the equilibrium value of r increases if θ  increases. 
• Subsidy: For a change in σ , 0>σd
dg  and 0<
dr
dg  and thus 0>σd
dr  which implies 
that the equilibrium value of r increases if σ  increases. 
• Number of firms: For a change in n, 0<
dn
dg . Since 0<
dr
dg  it holds that 0<
dn
dr  
which implies that the equilibrium value of r decreases if n increases. 
• Number of market periods: Finally, the equilibrium value of r is independent of 
the number of market periods, T, because a firm can only receive strictly positive 
Nash equilibrium market profits if it is the only low cost firm. In our model the 
number of market periods in which this low cost firm can make such profits is 
entirely determined by the first period and the additional number of patent-
protected market periods θ . However, T is the upper boundary of θ  and thus may 
have an indirect effect on r*. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. If firms choose the symmetric Nash equilibrium investment 
level, this yields the following implications for added welfare shares of different interest 
groups. Note first that the investment level r is strictly increasing in σ  and θ  as was 
shown in Proposition 1 ( 0>σd
dr  and 0>θd
dr ). In the following we first present the 
derivatives of welfare shares with respect to σ , then with respect to θ . The added 
government rent is given by 
σσ ∗∗ −= nrrGR ),(    (2). 
Hence, an increase in the subsidized proportion σ  yields  
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PR otransfer t.0),,( ⎭⎬
⎫<−−=∂
∂ ∗∗∗ nr
d
drnrGR σσσ
θσ  
Moreover, expected added consumer rent is given by49  
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[ ] ,)(1)(
)1()(1)(),,(
2
1
cTrFrF
k
n
cTrFrnFrCR
knn
k
k
ne
Δ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
Δ−−−=
−∗
=
∗
−∗∗∗
∑
θσθ
 
which can be rewritten as 
[ ]
[ ] .)1()(1)(
)(1),,(
1 crFrnF
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n
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−∗∗
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   (3) 
This yields  
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Finally, expected added producer rent is given by 
[ ] .)1()1()(1)(),,( 1 ∗−∗∗∗ −−Δ+−= rncrFrnFrPR ne σθσθ    (4) 
Hence, we have 
[ ] [ ][ ]
.
)()1()(1)(1)()1(),,(
GR fromtransfer 
CR fromtransfer 
*
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σ
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σθσ
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d
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d
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Now we concentrate on an increase of the number of patent-protected periods θ . 
Concerning government rent this yields 
PR otransfer t.0),,( ⎭⎬
⎫<−=∂
∂ ∗∗
θσθ
θσ
d
drnrGR  
                                                 
49 For a derivation of the added consumer rent see the Mathematical Appendix D1. 
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Note that 0),,( =∂
∂ ∗
θ
θσrGR  if we consider ‘pure’ instruments (i.e., 0=σ  if patent 
protection is on hand). 
The derivatives of CRe and PRe with respect to θ  are given by 
[ ]
[ ] [ ][ ]
[ ]
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Then, our proposition holds, because there is rent shifting both between firms and 
government as well as between firms and consumers as indicated by curly brackets. 
More precisely, the first term of PR equals the second term of CR and the decrease of 
GR equals the increasing second term in PR. This is valid for an increase in the 
subsidized proportion as well as for an increase in the number of patent-protected 
periods. ■  
 
A2: Derivations  
D1: Derivation added consumer rent 
Expected total consumer rent if firms invest is given by: 
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
TcprF
cpTrFrF
k
n
cprFrnF
cpTrFrnFrCRTotal
Hn
Lkn
n
k
k
Hn
Lne
)())(1(
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   (A1) 
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Total consumer rent if no firm invests in R&D (benchmark situation) is given by: 
.)( Tcp H−  Thus, subtracting the benchmark situation from the expected total CR 
results in an expected added consumer rent of: 
[ ]
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This expression can be rewritten as:  
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because TT =++−− )1()1( θθ  and 
[ ] [ ] 1))(1()(1)()(1)(
2
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⎞
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kn rFrFrF
k
n
rFrnF . (A3) yields expected 
added consumer rent given in Proposition 2. 
 
D2: Derivation of the optimal investment for our parameterization 
The profit function of firm i (i={1, 2, 3}) with an endowment B=100 at the market stage 
in each of the 30 rounds is given by: 
BrrFrFrFcprrr ikji
L
kjii +−−−−+−= )1())(1))((1)(()1)((),,( σθπ  
Taking the equilibrium price p=cH, 5.0101)( ii rrF = , T=2, 5.0=σ  and 1=θ  yield the 
following first order conditions (FOC): 
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Solving these equation systems for each treatment leads to the equilibrium investments 
presented in Table 2. 
SOC general case:  
0
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For the given parameters SOC is always negative. 
 
D3: Added welfare 
In general, expected added welfare through R&D is given by 
[ ] ,))(11()(
11
∑∏
==
−Δ−−=
n
i
i
n
i
i
e rcTrFrW  
where cΔ  gives the increase in welfare if at least one firm succeeds in R&D,50 which 
occurs with probability [ ]∏
=
−−
n
i
irF
1
)(11 , and ∑
=
n
i
ir
1
 gives the total R&D investment 
costs in the industry.  
 
Expected added welfare for symmetric R&D investment levels ri=r is given by 
[ ] .))(11()( nrcTrFrW ne −Δ−−=  
                                                 
50 The additional welfare of a lower market price if at least one firm’s innovation is successful compared 
to the initial higher price is given by ccccpcp LHHL Δ≡−=−−− )()( . 
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D4: Comparative statics of the optimal investment 
The optimal investment is characterized by the first order condition: 
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With the implicit function theorem 
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 we can show that the 
firm’s investment decreases with an increase in the rival’s investment: 
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A3: Additional experimental results 
Mark-ups of the firms are defined as price – costs and represent the firm’s 
incentive to innovate. Recall that theoretically predicted mark-ups if there are zero, one, 
two and three innovations are 0, 399, 0, and 0 points in the first market; 0, 0, 0, and 0 in 
the second market for NO and SUB due to imitation, and 0, 399, 0, and 0 in the second 
market for PAT. Table A4 shows that mark-ups deviate to some extent from Nash 
predictions. Hence, observed mark-ups are higher when zero-mark-ups are predicted if 
there are no, two, or three low cost firms and slightly lower when mark-ups of 399 
points are predicted if there is a sole low cost firm. Moreover, deviations appear to be 
systematic. First, observed average mark-ups are always larger in the first than the 
second market period for a given cost structure and treatment, except when there is only 
one low cost firm in PAT.51 Second, mark-ups rank in a specific ascending order of cost 
structures: Three low cost firms achieve somewhat higher mark-ups than three high cost 
firms, and two low cost firms have somewhat higher mark-ups than three low and high 
cost firms, i.e., it holds zero < three < two < one low cost firms for a given market 
                                                 
51 This result is driven by the higher price setting in the first market. 
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period and treatment. Table A4 shows that in terms of providing incentives to invest in 
R&D PAT is not only the best policy for a sole innovating firm as the observed 
(theoretically predicted) sum of mark-ups of both periods amounts to 788.87 (798) 
compared to 407.76 and 380.26 (both 399) in NO and SUB, but furthermore it also 
yields the highest sum of mark-ups for all other cost structures (zero, two and three). In 
SUB mark-ups over both periods are lowest. Note that here incentives to innovate refer 
to a ‘pure’ mark-up effect (and target solely at the revenue side of firms) neglecting 
incentives which arise from a reduction of investment costs.  
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Figures and Tables 
Figure A1: Individual investment behavior 
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Figure A2: Average lowest prices for each cost structure over rounds  
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Figure A2 gives average lowest prices for each cost structure in the 1st and 2nd 
Bertrand markets for each round. In case there is no entry there was no group consisting 
57 
 
of that special number of low cost firms in that specific round. Note that the number of 
low cost firms only refers to the cost structure in the first market period (i.e., it refers to 
the number of initially successfully innovating firms). The labeling specifies different 
cost structures after the investment stage and gives prices for both periods of the 
Bertrand market. 
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Table A1: Discrete symmetric and asymmetric Nash equilibrium investment levels 
Treatment Investment decision ri rj rk 
NO 0 0 99 
 20 25 30 
 20 26 29 
 20 27 28 
 21 24 30 
 21 25 29 
 21 26 28 
 21 27 27 
 22 23 30 
 22 24 29 
 22 25 28 
 22 26 27 
 23 23 29 
 23 24 28 
 23 25 27 
 23 26 26 
 24 24 27 
 24 25 26 
 25 25 25 
SUB 0 0 99 
 37 37 37 
PAT 0 0 99 
 37 37 37 
399=Δc  is taken for the computation of equilibria (compare footnote 25). 
 
Table A2: OLS regression results with CR1 as base category 
 (1) 
Investment coefficient (St. er.)
NO 44.08*** (5.057) 
SUB 57.41*** (3.272) 
PAT 74.74*** (0.748) 
CR0t-1*NO -15.82*** (2.870) 
CR0t-1*SUB -25.63*** (1.862) 
CR0t-1*PAT -46.84*** (4.337) 
CR2t-1*NO -3.872* (2.169) 
CR2t-1*SUB -3.171 (2.543) 
CR2t-1*PAT -8.722*** (2.585) 
CR3t-1*NO -9.592** (4.391) 
CR3t-1*SUB -1.834 (2.590) 
CR3t-1*PAT -15.49*** (1.304) 
N 2610  
R2 0.218  
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters. Cost reduction dummy variable 
‘CR1’ is dropped as base category. As we drop the constant in the estimated models, the reported R2 is 
taken from the (analogous) model (2) as presented in Table A3. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A3: OLS regression results with SUB as base category 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Investment coefficient (St. er.) coefficient (St. er.) coefficient (St. er.) 
NO -3.521 (3.336) -3.521 (3.340) -8.171** (2.855) 
PAT -3.881 (4.222) -3.881 (4.227) -7.511* (4.008) 
_cons 31.78*** (2.086) 31.78*** (2.088) 34.84*** (1.626) 
CRt-1*NO -12.16*** (3.813)   -11.994*** (3.709) 
CRt-1* PAT  14.14** (4.967)   14.316** (4.915) 
CRt-1 23.34*** (3.096)   23.088*** (2.983) 
CR1t-1*NO   -9.803** (3.422)   
CR1t-1*PAT   21.22*** (4.720)   
CR1t-1   25.63*** (1.862)   
CR2t-1*NO   -10.50** (4.472)   
CR2t-1*PAT   15.67*** (4.660)   
CR2t-1   22.45*** (3.652)   
CR3t-1*NO   -17.56*** (4.201)   
CR3t-1*PAT   7.564 (5.153)   
CR3t-1   23.79*** (3.160)   
round1_15*NO     9.393*** (2.441) 
round1_15*PAT     7.290** (2.840) 
round1_15     -6.004*** (1.888) 
N 2610  2610  2610  
R2 0.211  0.218  0.215  
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters. Treatment dummy variable 
‘SUB’ is dropped as base category. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A4: Average mark-ups in the Bertrand markets 
Bertrand 
markets Treatment 
Number of innovating firms 
Zero One Two three 
1st 
NO 8.37 394.37 46.13 24.14 
SUB 7.36 373.00 27.77 12.69 
PAT 19.29 393.88 49.20 31.36 
2nd 
NO 4.66 13.39 14.23 13.55 
SUB 4.93 7.26 8.77 6.12 
PAT 4.53 394.99 24.48 11.13 
Both 
periods 
NO 13.03 407.76 60.36 37.69 
SUB 12.29 380.26 36.54 18.81 
PAT 23.82 788.87 73.68 42.49 
The number of innovating firms indicates the successfully innovating firms after the investment stage 
(i.e., low cost firms in the first market period), but does not refer to imitating firms in the second market 
period. 
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